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HEADS I WIN, TAILS YOU LOSE: THE TAXING RISK WHEN
INVOKING THE FIFTH AMENDMENT ON A TAX RETURN
Jacob Hoback*

I. INTRODUCTION

Every calendar year includes fun holidays, such as Christmas,
Valentine’s Day, and Independence Day. But not all famous dates of
the calendar year are affiliated with the same joy as other holidays. On
April 15th, taxpayers must file their tax returns with the Internal
Revenue Service.1 Due to the complexity and cost of filing taxes, Tax
Day is not a day that many citizens celebrate.2 In 2018, the average
American family paid $15,748 in taxes.3 Further, taxpayers almost
unanimously agree that the U.S. tax system is too complicated.4
Therefore, in both cost and practice, Tax Day is an onerous day for
citizens.
An already unfavorable holiday is even more burdensome for
taxpayers who have acquired income through illegal activity. When
taxpayers report their gross income, they must include illegally-earned
income.5 Additionally, they must disclose the income’s nature and
source.6 As a result, the government can use that specific information
to prove that a taxpayer engaged in illegal activity and is thus
criminally liable.7 Nevertheless, taxpayers may invoke the Fifth
Amendment8 on their tax returns to protect themselves from
* Associate Member, 2020-21, University of Cincinnati Law Review. For inspiring me to study tax on a
deeper level and her profound help with this Note, I thank Professor of Law Stephanie Hunter McMahon.
Additionally, I would like to thank the wonderful Law Review editors, my dear friends, and other helpful
professors. Finally, I would like to thank my family for believing in me, even when I did not believe in
myself. All remaining errors are mine alone.
1. 26 U.S.C § 6072(a) (2020).
2. Unless, of course, they received a significant refund.
3. HOW MUCH DOES THE AVERAGE AMERICAN FAMILY PAY IN TAXES?, USA FACTS (Sept. 28, 2020,
11:35 AM), https://usafacts.org/articles/average-taxes-paid-income-payroll-government-transfers-2018/
[https://perma.cc/HP3Q-XCQP].
4. Why
are
taxes
so
complicated?,
TAX
POL’Y
CENTER,
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/why-are-taxes-socomplicated#:~:text=POLITICS%20OF%20TAX%20POLICY,sources%20and%20uses%20of%20inco
me. [https://perma.cc/98XD-NGA7] (last visited Nov. 30, 2020).
5. James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 218 (1961) (“[U]nlawful, as well as lawful, gains are
comprehended within the term ‘gross income.’”).
6. Richard B. Stanley, Comments: Conflict Between the Internal Revenue Code and the Fifth
Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 15 U. BALT. L. REV. 527, 551 (1986).
7. See, e.g., Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648 (1976).
8. “Fifth Amendment” in this Article will refer exclusively to the privilege from selfincrimination. The use of “Fifth Amendment” does not include the other securities therein, such as the
right to due process.
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prosecution by not disclosing the incriminating information.9 But this
protection is not sufficient, because if a court holds that a taxpayer’s
Fifth Amendment claim is not valid, the government can prosecute the
taxpayer under federal law for tax evasion, specifically for not
providing the information necessary to calculate tax liability.10
To provide taxpayers with the full protection of the Fifth
Amendment, the government should offer taxpayers precompliance
review. Precompliance review is an opportunity to have a neutral
decisionmaker review the validity of an individual’s Fifth Amendment
claim before the individual would face penalties for tax evasion.11
Under the law today, when taxpayers invoke the Fifth Amendment on
their tax returns, the IRS can sue the taxpayers for not disclosing the
particular information on their tax returns necessary to calculate tax
liability and will prevail if the court finds that their claims are invalid.12
On the other hand, however, offering precompliance review would
allow taxpayers to receive a preliminary judicial ruling on the validity
of their claims before facing penalties for failing to comply.
Consequently, taxpayers would know whether their claims would
prevail and not have to face federal tax evasion charges for invalid
claims made in good faith. To be clear, this Note does not argue that
taxpayers should be excused from paying taxes on illegally-earned
income. Even if a taxpayer does have a valid claim of Fifth
Amendment privilege, the taxpayer should still face tax liability, but
the taxpayer should not have to disclose the specific incriminating
information.13
Taxpayers should not have to risk federal prosecution for tax
evasion to invoke constitutional protection. Therefore, this Note
argues that taxpayers who invoke the Fifth Amendment should be
entitled to an opportunity for precompliance review. First, Section II
presents the background of Fifth Amendment jurisprudence generally
and as applied to tax returns. Next, Section III explains what
precompliance review is and how the government offers
precompliance review in other areas of the law. Finally, Section IV
discusses why the government should afford taxpayers with an
9. United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259, 263 (1926). To be clear, under Sullivan, taxpayers
would still have to provide the relevant, non-incriminating information. See Stanley, supra note 6, at 558.
10. Garner, 424 U.S. at 663; 26 U.S.C. § 7203 (2020).
11. City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409, 421 (2015).
12. Garner, 424 U.S. at 663; 26 U.S.C. § 7203 (2020).
13. See Stanley, supra note 6, at 558. (“A taxpayer must prepare a return, or make a similar
calculation, to determine the exact amount of his annual liability. The filing of the return with the final
tax payment is, of course, unnecessary for the IRS to receive the tax payment. The government's power
to collect tax, therefore, does not require the filing of an income tax return from individuals who are
incriminated by filing.”).
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opportunity for precompliance review.
II. BACKGROUND

The requirement for taxpayers to report their illegally-earned
income has raised Fifth Amendment self-incrimination concerns. The
Fifth Amendment of the Constitution provides that “[n]o person . . .
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself.”14 An individual faces the risk of self-incrimination when the
government forces the individual to provide information that “would
furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the
[individual].”15 Consequently, taxpayers have argued that reporting
their illegally-earned income would allow the government to use the
tax returns as a chain of evidence to obtain a conviction.16
This Section describes the evolution of the Court’s application of
Fifth Amendment protection, both generally and with respect to tax
returns. First, Part A explains general, basic Fifth Amendment
jurisprudence. Second, Part B explains how the Court has applied the
Fifth Amendment to tax returns.
A. The Fifth Amendment

The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution provides that “[n]o
person…shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself.”17 Importantly, the Founders added the Bill of Rights
to the Constitution “in the conviction that too high a price may be paid
even for the unhampered enforcement of the criminal law.”18 The selfincrimination clause in the Fifth Amendment comes from the cry of
British citizens protesting their government, “No one is bound to
accuse himself.”19 The protest was a response to the government’s
unjust methods of interrogating alleged criminals in England.20 As a
result of the protests, the English courts established a freedom from
self-incrimination.21 Accordingly, there was no formalized British rule
established by Parliament.22 Ultimately, the privilege against self14. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
15. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951) (citing Blau v. United States, 340 U.S.
159, 161 (1950)).
16. See infra Part B.
17. U.S. CONST. amend V.
18. Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486-87 (quoting Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487, 489 (1944)).
19. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 596 (1896).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 596-97.
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incrimination became such a significant part of British criminal
procedure that it is included in the U.S. Constitution.23
The Supreme Court has applied the Fifth Amendment broadly. For
example, the Fifth Amendment does not just protect citizens from
disclosures that would directly support a conviction. The Fifth
Amendment protects citizens against disclosures that “would furnish a
link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant.”24
Importantly, to wield its protection defendants must immediately
claim the privilege, otherwise they effectively waive the privilege.25
Also, for a court to protect a defendant’s privilege from selfincrimination, the defendant’s apprehension of conviction must be
“real and appreciable.”26 Finally, if a defendant has voluntarily
revealed self-incriminating facts to the government, the defendant
cannot invoke the privilege to avoid disclosing further specific
details.27
B. The Fifth Amendment as Applied to Tax Returns

The requirement for taxpayers to report illegally-earned income has
been subject to Fifth Amendment litigation. When taxpayers prepare
their tax returns, taxpayers must first determine their gross income.28
Gross income includes income from illegal activities.29 Therefore,
taxpayers who earn income from illegal activity face a “cruel
trilemma.”30 If they file their tax returns accurately, they tacitly admit
that they committed a crime by identifying the nature or source of the
income; if they file their tax returns inaccurately, they commit perjury;
and if they fail to file their tax returns, they commit tax evasion.31 In
certain situations, taxpayers still report their illegally-earned income
despite the likelihood of prosecution.32 For example, some taxpayers
who fear that they will inevitably be convicted report their illegallyearned income “to avoid getting charged twice: once for their initial
23. Id. at 597; U.S. CONST. amend V.
24. Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486 (citing Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159, 161 (1950)).
25. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 371 (1951) (quoting United States v. Murdock, 284
U.S. 141, 148 (1943)).
26. Brown, 161 U.S. at 599.
27. Rogers, 340 U.S. at 373.
28. How to File Your Federal Taxes, USAGOV, https://www.usa.gov/file-taxes
[https://perma.cc/U4TF-CLS7] (last visited Nov. 30, 2020).
29. See James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 218 (1961).
30. United States v. Egan, 459 F.2d 997, 997 (2d Cir. 1972).
31. Id. at 997-98.
32. Steve Hargreaves, The IRS wants to tax your illegal income, CNNMONEY (Mar. 7, 2013, 12:47
PM),
https://money.cnn.com/2013/02/28/news/economy/illegal-income-tax/index.html
[https://perma.cc/5RRA-FN9H].
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crime, and again for evading the taxes on their windfall.”33
Consequently, ever since the genesis of federal income tax, taxpayers
have invoked the Fifth Amendment to preclude them from
incriminating themselves.34
The Court’s approach to applying the Fifth Amendment to tax
returns has significantly evolved. Interestingly, income tax is relatively
new to the United States, having existed for just over a century.35
Therefore, the law is still developing. This Part analyzes the evolution
of the Court’s handling of Fifth Amendment tax return cases.
1. United States v. Sullivan

Even if a taxpayer has a valid claim of Fifth Amendment privilege,
the taxpayer must still file a tax return.36 Just eleven years after the
government began requiring taxpayers to pay taxes on illegal income,
a taxpayer claimed Fifth Amendment protection and did not file his tax
return.37 In Sullivan, the taxpayer earned income through illegal liquor
trafficking; therefore, he had to report his earnings to the
government.38 Because he feared that reporting income through his
illegal activity would incriminate him, he did not file a tax return.39
Consequently, his refusal to complete his tax return made him subject
to prosecution under the Revenue Act of 1921.40 He contended,
however, that if he submitted his tax return accurately, he would
effectively be self-incriminating himself because his business was in
violation of the National Prohibition Act.41 Justice Holmes, writing for
a unanimous Court, held that the plea for Fifth Amendment protection
“was pressed too far,” because while the taxpayer could have invoked
a valid claim of Fifth Amendment privilege on his tax return, he could
not simply refuse to file a return at all.42 Therefore, under Sullivan, a
taxpayer can, in theory, successfully invoke the Fifth Amendment, but
the taxpayer must do so on the tax return.43

33. Id.
34. See infra Subsections 1-6.
35. In 1913, Congress ratified the Sixteenth Amendment which gave Congress the “power to lay
and collect taxes on incomes.” U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
36. United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259, 263 (1927).
37. Id. at 262-63.
38. Id. at 263.
39. Id. at 262.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 263.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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2. United States v. Kahriger

Similar to tax returns, the requirement for an illegal gambler to
register for an occupational tax was also the subject of Fifth
Amendment litigation.44 In 1951, Congress levied a tax on citizens
who earned revenue from the illegal business of accepting wagers.45
Congress also required taxpayers in the business of accepting wagers
to register with the Collector of Internal Revenue. 46 In Kahriger, the
taxpayer engaged in illegal gambling and was therefore required to
register as an illegal gambler.47 Nevertheless, the taxpayer refused, and
the government brought charges against him.48 In response, the
taxpayer fought the charges, arguing that if he registered as a gambler,
he would effectively be providing the basis for the government to
obtain his conviction.49
The Court found the occupational tax constitutional.50 It reasoned
that a taxpayer registering for the occupational tax as an illegal
gambler does not indicate that the taxpayer had violated the law;
instead, the taxpayer is merely completing a condition required to
engage in the business.51 In other words, although registering for the
occupational tax might indicate a clear intent to violate the law, it does
not guarantee that the taxpayer would do so.52 Therefore, under
Kahriger, the Fifth Amendment does not prohibit the government from
requiring taxpayers to disclose what they might do; instead, the Fifth
Amendment only prohibits the government from requiring taxpayers
to disclose what they had done illegally in the past.53
3. Lewis v. United States

The Court reaffirmed its holding in Kahriger only two years later in
Lewis v. United States.54 Writing for a divided Court, Justice Minton
reaffirmed that requiring a gambler to register with the Collector of
44. United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953). Although the next few cases are about
registering for an occupational tax, they are still applied when analyzing Fifth Amendment claims on tax
returns. See, e.g., Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 659 n.13 (1976) (citing Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22
(1953)).
45. Kahriger, 345 U.S. at 23.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 24.
50. Id. at 32.
51. Id. at 32-33.
52. Id. at 32.
53. Id. at 32-33.
54. 348 U.S. 419 (1955).
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Internal Revenue was not a violation of a taxpayer’s freedom from
self-incrimination.55 In Lewis v. United States, the government
convicted the taxpayer for engaging in illegal gambling without
registering for the occupational tax.56 The taxpayer faced the same
dilemma as the taxpayer in Kahriger: if he registered for the
occupational tax, it could lead to his conviction.57 Consequently, he
did not register for the tax, arguing that the occupational tax violated
his freedom from self-incrimination.58 Importantly, the taxpayer did
not argue that the Fifth Amendment applied prospectively, but rather
that the occupational tax was de facto retrospective.59 In other words,
to pay the occupational tax, the taxpayer would have already had to
have made an illegal wager.60 Nevertheless, the Court ultimately
rejected the taxpayer’s argument.61 It applied a strict reading of the text
and concluded that, although unlikely, one could have never accepted
a wager and still register for the occupational tax.62
Justice Black took a more pragmatic approach in his dissent.63
Justice Black gave an overview of what taxpayers would have to do to
comply with the statute.64 First, taxpayers would have to register with
the Collector of Internal Revenue, revealing that they engaged in the
business of wagering in violation of federal law.65 Further, taxpayers
would have to specify where they conducted their business and the
names and addresses of those with whom they worked.66 Therefore,
those requirements, Justice Black argued, were sufficient to convict a
taxpayer under federal anti-wagering laws and were therefore
unconstitutional.67
4. Marchetti v. United States

After a third challenge, the Court ultimately found the occupational
tax unconstitutional.68 Fifteen years after Lewis, the Court overruled
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 422.
Id. at 420.
See supra note 44.
Kahriger, 345 U.S. at 421.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 422.
Id.
Id. at 424 (Black, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 425.
Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 53 (1968).
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both Kahriger and Lewis in Marchetti v. United States.69 Like the
taxpayers in Kahriger and Lewis, the taxpayer in Marchetti was
convicted for refusing to comply with the occupational tax.70 The
Court found Kahriger and Lewis erroneous in two respects.71 First, the
Court reasoned that registration would increase the likelihood that past
or present wagering offenses would be discovered and prosecuted.72
Second, the Court rejected the presupposition in Kahriger and Lewis
that the self-incrimination privilege is not applicable to prospective
acts since there is no basis for such a “rigorous . . . constraint upon the
constitutional privilege.”73
The Marchetti Court applied a different analysis from its progeny to
reach its conclusion.74 First, the Court reexamined the standard for
application of the self-incrimination privilege—that the taxpayer must
be confronted by “‘real,’ and not merely trifling or imaginary, hazards
of incrimination.”75 Next, the Court found that the hazards of
incrimination created by the occupational tax were neither trifling nor
imaginary since taxpayers could reasonably fear that completing the
registration would increase their likelihood of prosecution for future
acts and would substantially aid in facilitating their convictions.76
Therefore, the Court concluded that the standard does not permit “the
rigid chronological distinction adopted in Kahriger and Lewis.”77
Consequently, the Court overruled Kahriger and Lewis.
5. Leary v. United States

The Court’s decision in Marchetti proved beneficial for taxpayers.
Just one year later in Leary v. United States, a taxpayer used Marchetti
as a defense to avoid complying with a different occupational tax
statute.78 The statute in Leary subjected all persons engaging in
business in the marijuana industry to an occupational tax, and taxpayer
argued that, like registering for the occupational tax in Marchetti, the
fear of self-incrimination in his case was “real and appreciable.”79 The
Court accepted the taxpayer’s argument, echoing Marchetti that the
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 54.
Id. at 40-41.
Id. at 52.
Id.
Id. at 53.
Id.
Id. (quoting Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 371 (1951)).
Id. at 54.
Id. at 53.
395 U.S. 6 (1969).
Id. at 13, 14 (quoting Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 48).
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taxpayer “had ample reason to fear that transmittal to [the government]
of the fact that he was a recent, unregistered transferee of marihuana
‘surely provide a significant link in a chain of evidence tending to
establish his guilt.’”80
6. United States v. Doe

In the most recent Supreme Court case about Fifth Amendment
protection of financial records, the Court made an important
distinction about when revealed information is considered
compelled.81 In Doe, the taxpayer was the owner of several sole
proprietorships. In the 1980s, a grand jury issued five subpoenas for
his financial records, including his tax returns, in the midst of an
investigation of corruption in the awarding of county and municipal
contracts.82
The Court found that preparing business records is voluntary, and
therefore, there was no compulsion.83 After all, the subpoena did not
require the taxpayer to affirm the accuracy of the records.84
Nevertheless, the Court did acknowledge that that while the substance
of a tax record may not be protected, the act of producing it may be,
explaining that, “[c]ompliance with [a] subpoena tacitly concedes the
existence of the papers demanded and their possession or control by
the taxpayer. It also would indicate the taxpayer's belief that the papers
are those described in the subpoena.”85 Therefore, the Court held that
the act of production could have had substantial testimonial value and
therefore remanded the case to the district court to consider whether
the evidence should have been precluded.86
Thus, the Court’s approach has evolved since Sullivan. Under the
law today, a taxpayer can invoke Fifth Amendment protection when
there is a reasonable apprehension that the information on the tax
return could substantially aid the government in obtaining a
conviction.
III. PRECOMPLIANCE REVIEW

A taxpayer’s decision to invoke the Fifth Amendment is not always
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 16 (quoting Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 48).
United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984).
Id. at 606.
Id. at 610.
Id. at 612.
Id. at 613 (quoting Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 125 (1957)).
Id. at 616-17.
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straightforward. When taxpayers wish to claim Fifth Amendment
protection, they must first decide whether claiming the privilege is
worth the ramifications of an unsuccessful claim. This dilemma is
unique to taxpayers because when a citizen wishes to invoke
constitutional protection in other contexts, an opportunity exists that is
not afforded to taxpayers: precompliance review. Precompliance
review is an opportunity to have a neutral decisionmaker review the
validity of an individual’s claim before the individual would face
penalties for noncompliance.87 Under precompliance review, citizens
who wish to invoke constitutional protection can have their claims
tested in court before suffering the consequences of refusing to comply
with the government if a court found that their claims were invalid.88
Consequently, citizens who receive precompliance review do not need
to risk the penalty of asserting an invalid claim of constitutional
privilege.
This Section provides an overview of situations where citizens are
afforded an opportunity for precompliance review and why the Court
held that precompliance review was not constitutionally required for
taxpayers. First, Part A explains how a witness in a judicial proceeding
wishing to invoke Fifth Amendment protection is afforded
precompliance review. Second, Part B explains how a citizen wishing
to invoke Fourth Amendment protection is entitled to precompliance
review. Next, Part C explains how taxpayers are afforded
precompliance review from the IRS when they want to verify that they
are complying with the Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”). Finally, Part
D explains why the Court held that this opportunity was not
constitutionally required for taxpayers who invoke the Fifth
Amendment.
A. Maness v. Meyers

A witness contemplating a claim of privilege in a judicial
proceeding has the opportunity for precompliance review.89 In Maness
v. Meyers, an attorney appealed a contempt ruling for advising a store
owner to not comply with a subpoena that demanded the store owner
to turn over illegal magazines.90 After approval from his client, the
attorney moved to quash the subpoena, arguing that the subpoena
required his client to incriminate himself.91
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409, 421 (2015).
See generally Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 663 (1976).
Id.
419 U.S. 449, 450, 457 (1975).
Id. at 451.
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The Court held that judicial witnesses are entitled to precompliance
review.92 First, the Court affirmed the maxim that lawyers generally
must encourage their clients to comply with court orders.93
Nevertheless, the Court clarified that orders requiring witnesses to
reveal information that could incriminate them are different, because
if a witness complies with an incriminating order, the court cannot
“unring the bell” after the information has been released.94 Therefore,
the Court reasoned that precompliance review is necessary to protect
an individual from compulsion to produce evidence that could
incriminate the individual.95 Further, the Court explained that without
precompliance review, the defendant would be compelled to surrender
“the very protection which the privilege is designed to guarantee.”96
B. City of Los Angeles v. Patel

Citizens who want to claim Fourth Amendment protection are also
entitled to precompliance review.97 In Patel, Los Angeles City Code
required hotel operators to record information about their guests to
help track criminals.98 The City Code also required hotel operators to
present their records to the police department upon an investigation.99
In 2003, several hotel operators sued the City of Los Angeles
challenging the constitutionality of the provisions under the Fourth
Amendment.100
Writing for a divided Court, Justice Sotomayor ruled the statute
unconstitutional because it did not afford hotel operators an
opportunity for precompliance review.101 The Court reasoned that
before suffering the consequences for not complying with a search,
citizens should be able to question the search’s reasonableness.102
Under the statute, a hotel owner who refused to allow a search could
be arrested on the spot, and the Court concluded that the government
could not reasonably subject citizens to that kind of choice—whether
to invoke protection and risk prosecution for noncompliance or comply

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 462.
Id. at 459-60.
Id. at 460.
Id. at 461.
Id. at 462 (quoting Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951)).
City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409, 413 (2015).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 419.
Id. at 420 (quoting Donovan v. Lone Steer, 464 U.S. 408, 415 (1984)).
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to what could be an unreasonable search.103 Further, the Court
explained that the statute created an “intolerable risk,” leading to
targeted harassment and oppression of citizens.104
C. Private Letter Rulings
Preliminary rulings are not foreign to the tax world. If a taxpayer
wants guidance from the IRS about the tax consequences of a
transaction, the taxpayer can request a private letter ruling (“PLR”). A
PLR is “a written statement issued to a taxpayer that interprets and
applies tax laws to the taxpayer’s represented set of facts.”105
PLRs are different from judicial opinions, but they function
similarly. First, PLRs do not come from the judiciary but rather from
the executive branch. Nevertheless, the IRS’s role in a PLR is similar
to that of a judge—apply the law to a unique set of facts. Second, PLRs
are only applicable to the taxpayers who request them.106 In other
words, taxpayers can only rely on the PLRs that they individually
request.107 Therefore, even a taxpayer with identical facts could not
rely on another taxpayer’s PLR, because the IRS is not bound by any
prior PLR.108 Nevertheless, a taxpayer could still use a PLR from
another taxpayer as persuasive authority.109 Further, in the interests of
fairness, it is unlikely that the IRS would capriciously rule differently
for taxpayers in different situations.
PLRs are well-regarded within the tax community. Tax scholars
have lauded tax rulings due to their “broad impact on [the] national
economy and on proper and reasonable tax administration.”110 Also,
PLRs benefit taxpayers by guiding them to decisions that will
ultimately avoid litigation with the IRS.111 Not only do PLRs benefit
the taxpayer, but they also benefit the IRS, because avoiding litigation
is likewise beneficial to the IRS.112 Further, PLRs elicit compliance by

103. Id. at 421.
104. Id.
105. Tax Exempt Bonds Private Letter Rulings: Some Basic Concepts, I.R.S.,
https://bit.ly/31noOYL [https://perma.cc/S9AH-YH2U] (last visited Nov. 30, 2020).
106. Stephanie Hunter McMahon, Classifying Tax Guidance According to End Users, 73 TAX LAW.
245, 261 (2020).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 261-62,
109. Id. at 262.
110. Mitchell Rogovin & Donald L. Korb, The Four R’s Revisited: Regulations, Rulings, Reliance,
and Retroactivity in the 21st Century: A View from Within, 46 DUQ. L. REV. 324, 344 (2008); See also
Joshua D. Blank, The Timing of Tax Transparency, 90 S. CAL. L. REV 449 (2017).
111. Id.
112. Id.
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guiding taxpayers through complex issues.113
Overall, while PLRs are different from judicial rulings, PLRs serve
the same purpose as precompliance review—to allow taxpayers test
the legality of their tax decisions to mitigate prosecution for
noncompliance with the IRC.
D. Precompliance Review of Fifth Amendment Claims on Tax
Returns
Taxpayers who do not disclose all information that is required on a
tax return violate 26 U.S.C. § 7203 (“Section 7203”). Section 7203
prohibits taxpayers from “willfully” failing to provide all applicable
information on their tax returns.114 While taxpayers can prevail on
valid Fifth Amendment claims, the government can prosecute
taxpayers under Section 7203 who raise invalid claims.115 In other
words, if a taxpayer’s apprehension of reporting the amount, nature, or
source of illegally-earned income on a tax return was not “real and
appreciable,” the government could prosecute the taxpayer under
Section 7203.116
Despite the opportunities for precompliance review in other
contexts, the government does not extend precompliance review to
taxpayers who invoke the Fifth Amendment. In Garner v. United
States, the government indicted Roy Garner for engaging in a
gambling conspiracy.117 At trial, the government introduced
supporting evidence from Garner’s tax returns where Garner labeled
himself as a professional gambler.118 Garner argued, however, that the
government could not use his tax return against him under the Fifth
Amendment, but the district court rejected his argument, holding that
by providing the information on his tax returns, Garner waived his
Fifth Amendment rights.119 Consequently, the jury found Garner
guilty.120 In response, Garner appealed, contending that he could not
113. Id. at 374. (“The Service and the Office of Chief Counsel believe that a key to furthering
compliance with the tax law is helping taxpayers to understand the law and to perceive that the [IRS] is
fairly and uniformly administering the [IRC].”).
114. 26 U.S.C. § 7203 (2020). (“Any person required under this title to pay any estimated. . .who
willfully fails to pay such estimated tax or tax, make such return, keep such records, or supply such
information, at the time or times required by law or regulations, shall, in addition to other penalties
provided by law, be guilty. . .”).
115. Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 662 (1976).
116. An individual does not have a valid Fifth Amendment claim if the apprehension is not “real
and appreciable.” See supra pp. 3-4.
117. 424 U.S. at 649.
118. Id. at 649-50.
119. Id. at 657.
120. Id. at 650.
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have waived Fifth Amendment protection since the government
compelled him to provide the information and that, like a witness in a
judicial proceeding, he should have been afforded precompliance
review.121
The Court did not agree.122 Instead, it reasoned that taxpayers are
not compelled to make the disclosures because taxpayers have a “free
choice to admit, to deny, or refuse to answer” when filing their
returns.123 In other words, if Garner believed that the information
provided on a tax return was incriminating, Garner could have invoked
the Fifth Amendment on his tax return.124 Accordingly, Garner was
never actually compelled to disclose the information.125 Therefore,
since the government did not deny him an opportunity to refuse to
answer, he was never compelled to disclose his illegal activity.126
The Court further explained that Section 7203’s requirement for
“willfulness” provided taxpayers with sufficient protection, even
without precompliance review.127 Importantly, the Court noted that the
willfulness requirement effectively prohibited the government from
prosecuting a taxpayer for making an invalid claim of privilege in good
faith.128 But the concurring justices disagreed.129 Justice Marshall
found that the willfulness requirement did not totally afford the
protection that the Fifth Amendment provides.130 Nevertheless, the
majority reasoned that lack of precompliance review would not injure
a taxpayer who made a good-faith claim of privilege, whether valid or
invalid.131
Therefore, since taxpayers have an opportunity to raise the Fifth
Amendment and not provide incriminating information, and Section
7203 broadens Fifth Amendment protection by requiring willfulness,
the Court held that precompliance review is not constitutionally
required for taxpayers who invoke the Fifth Amendment.132

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id.
Id. at 656-65.
Id. at 657.
Id.
Id. at 665.
Id.
Id. at 663.
Id. at 663 n.18.
Id. at 667-68 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment).
Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment).
Id. at 663 n.18.
Id. at 665.
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IV. DISCUSSION

The government should afford taxpayers the opportunity for
precompliance review to allow taxpayers with illegally-earned income
to test the validity of their Fifth Amendment claims. While
implementing precompliance review might seem burdensome for the
government, affording taxpayers precompliance review would not
rework the Court’s Fifth Amendment jurisprudence or dismantle the
IRS’s existing procedures. After all, the opportunity for precompliance
review is afforded and recognized in many other legal spaces.
Nevertheless, the government does not extend precompliance review
to taxpayers, even though there is no compelling reason for such
inconsistency. First, judicial witnesses are afforded the opportunity of
precompliance review under the Fifth Amendment.133 Second,
precompliance review is not exclusive to the Fifth Amendment when
combatting the potential of governmental overreach. The Court in
Patel extended this opportunity for precompliance review to
individuals questioning the reasonableness of a search and seizure
under the Fourth Amendment.134 Finally, the IRS already has its own
system of quasi-precompliance review through PLRs. Overall,
precompliance review is not new to modern criminal procedure, nor is
it new to the tax world. Therefore, the government should offer
precompliance review to taxpayers who invoke the Fifth Amendment
on their tax returns.
This Section demonstrates three ways that the government can
extend the opportunity for precompliance review to taxpayers.
Importantly, the government can successfully afford taxpayers
precompliance review by applying any one of the three proposals.
First, Part A explains how the government could reconsider Garner
and ultimately hold that taxpayers who earn gross income through
illegal activity are compelled to incriminate themselves. Next, Part B
demonstrates how the government could use recent Fourth
Amendment precedent in Patel to conclude that taxpayers have a
constitutional right to precompliance review. Finally, Part C
demonstrates how the government could provide taxpayers an
opportunity for precompliance review, even without judicial
declaration.

133. Id. at 664.
134. See City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409, 419 (2015).
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A. Rethinking Compulsion
A taxpayer does not have a free choice to refuse to provide
information on a tax return just because the taxpayer may invoke the
Fifth Amendment. The Court in Garner concluded that the taxpayer
was not compelled to incriminate himself because he had a “free
choice to admit, to deny, or refuse to answer.”135 In other words, the
taxpayer had the ability to refuse to answer by making a valid claim of
privilege.136 But this conclusion is drawn from a flawed assumption—
that a taxpayer will always bring a valid claim.
Taxpayers must be extremely confident in their Fifth Amendment
claims, whereas witnesses in judicial proceedings do not need to be. If
a judicial witness invokes a Fifth Amendment protection claim, the
court can test it, and if the court finds the claim invalid, the witness
can reconsider it before facing penalties for noncompliance.137 A
taxpayer, on the other hand, is not afforded the same privilege; the
taxpayer must make an informed guess about the strength of the claim
and hope that a court agrees, because if a court holds that the taxpayer’s
claim is invalid, the government can prosecute the taxpayer for tax
evasion, without giving the taxpayer an opportunity to reconsider.138
The risk required to invoke the Fifth Amendment contradicts
Garner’s ruling that taxpayers have the freedom to refuse to answer.
In Garner, the Court explained that compulsion exists where there is a
factor that prevents a taxpayer from claiming the privilege.139
Importantly, since a serious risk exists when invoking the Fifth
Amendment on a tax return, a taxpayer could ultimately be better off
by not invoking the Fifth Amendment and risking federal prosecution.
In other words, the possibility of prosecution for tax evasion could be
a factor that prevents a taxpayer from invoking the Fifth Amendment.
A hypothetical is necessary to illustrate this.
Suppose Andrew, an Ohio citizen, wagered an online bet on a
professional baseball game and won $100. Andrew would then be
required to report the $100 on his tax return. Reporting the source of
the income, however, would be evidence that Andrew violated state
law forbidding online sports betting.140 Andrew would likely prevail
in court if he invoked Fifth Amendment protection on his tax return.
Nevertheless, the ramifications would be severe if a court rejected his
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Garner, 424 U.S. at 657 (quoting Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 241 (1941)).
Id. at 663.
Id. at 664.
Id.
Id. at 654 n.9.
29 O.R.C. § 2915.02 (2020).
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claim of privilege, since the government could prosecute him under
federal law for tax evasion. Generally, individuals have different levels
of risk aversion, but it is safe to assume most reasonable people do not
want to risk violating federal law, even if it meant being convicted for
a state law misdemeanor. Therefore, suppose Andrew decided to not
risk conviction for tax evasion and reported the earnings from his
illegal bet. Under Garner’s definition of compulsion, Andrew was
compelled, because here, a factor existed that kept Andrew from
claiming the privilege.
The requirement for “willfulness” under Section 7203 is insufficient
in affording taxpayers Fifth Amendment protection. The Court
explained in Garner that the willfulness requirement does provide
taxpayers some protection if a taxpayer’s claim is invalid.141 Indeed,
due to the willfulness element, a good faith claim, even if invalid,
could entitle the taxpayer to acquittal.142 Nevertheless, even this
broadened protection still falls short of adequately protecting
taxpayers.143 Importantly, even the concurring justices recognized that
with the willfulness requirement, taxpayers still face a risk of criminal
penalty when invoking the Fifth Amendment.144 Therefore, the Court
in Garner should have found the willfulness requirement insufficient
and instead afforded taxpayers the opportunity for precompliance
review.
The Court should overrule Garner and hold that taxpayers are
compelled to disclose illegally-earned income. Not only did the Court
underappreciate the risk that taxpayers entertain to invoke the Fifth
Amendment, but the Court also overestimated the effect of Section
7203’s requirement for willfulness. Therefore, the Court should
overrule Garner and establish that the Fifth Amendment requires
precompliance review for taxpayers.
B. The Intersectionality of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments
The relationship between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments has not

141. Garner, 424 U.S. at 663 n.18.
142. Id.
143. Camara v. Municipal Court of City and County of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967)
(“Broad statutory safeguards are no substitute for individualized review, particularly when those
safeguards may only be invoked at the risk of a criminal penalty.”).
144. Garner, 424 U.S. at 667-68 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment) (“It is one thing to deny a
good-faith defense to a witness who is given a prompt ruling on the validity of his claim of privilege and
an opportunity to reconsider his refusal to testify before subjecting himself to possible punishment for
contempt. It would be quite another to deny a good-faith defense to someone like petitioner, who may be
denied a ruling on the validity of his claim of privilege until his criminal prosecution, when it is too late
to reconsider.”) (internal citations omitted).
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gone unnoticed. In Boyd v. United States, the Court asserted that there
is an “intimate relation” between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.145
Further, the Court explained that they “throw great light on each other”
since the reason for prohibiting unlawful searches and seizures is to
prevent the government from compelling citizens to release evidence
that would incriminate themselves.146 This view of the relationship
between the Fourth Amendment and the Fifth Amendment has
evolved, and in some respects, has been criticized.147 Nevertheless,
there still exists an acknowledged penumbra of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments—that the government cannot unreasonably retrieve
information from its citizens.148
The strikingly similar situations in Patel and Garner are evidence
that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments cannot be seen as completely
distinct. In Patel, the statute compelled hotel owners to turn over their
records whenever requested by the government.149 Similarly, Section
7203 compels taxpayers to file a tax return, which includes properly
calculating gross income and reporting income earned through illegal
activity.150 Also, under the statute in Patel, a hotel owner who refused
to comply with the search could be “arrested on the spot.”151 Similarly,
a taxpayer who refuses to file a tax return can be prosecuted under
Section 7203.152 However, not all searches, seizures, and required
disclosures are constitutional; therefore, hotel owners may want to
contest the reasonableness of a search from the Patel statute, and
taxpayers may want to contest whether certain disclosures on their tax
returns would incriminate them. Nevertheless, hotel owners would
likely not prevail every time they contested a search. Therefore, hotel
owners would have to weigh the likelihood of the Fourth Amendment
claim against the severity of the prosecution for failing to comply. The
Court in Patel, however, concluded that hotel owners could not
“reasonably be put to this kind of choice,” and therefore,
145. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886).
146. Id.
147. United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 618 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). (“Several of Boyd’s
express or implicit declarations [had] not stood the test of time.”)
148. See, e.g., Michael S. Pardo, Disentangling the Fourth Amendment and the Self-Incrimination
Clause, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1857 (2005). This type of argument has been accepted by the Court. See, e.g.,
Griswold v. Connecticut, 318 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). In fact, the argument here takes fewer leaps than the
argument in Griswold. Under Griswold, the Court held that the entire Bill of Rights had a penumbra of
privacy, whereas this argument suggests simply that the two Amendments have the same goal. In other
words, the argument that a penumbra exists in the Fourth and Fifth Amendment is significantly narrower
than the argument that was accepted by the Court in Griswold.
149. City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409, 413 (2015).
150. Garner, 424 U.S. at 651; 26 U.S.C. § 7203 (2020).
151. Patel, 576 U.S. at 421.
152. Garner, 424 U.S. at 651; 26 U.S.C. § 7203 (2020).
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precompliance review was necessary for the law to be
constitutional.153 Therefore, since the facts are nearly identical in Patel
and Garner, the Court could apply the reasoning in Patel to hold that
precompliance review is constitutionally required for taxpayers.
The Garner Court did not value the risk of invoking the Fifth
Amendment, similar to how a high-risk gambler does not value the risk
in making wagers. In other words, when a wild gambler considers a
bet, all the gambler can think about is, “This bet is great, because if I
win, I’ll be rich!” On the other hand, the Patel Court viewed the risk
of invoking the Fifth Amendment as a risk-averse gambler would view
a bet. Generally, a reasonable gambler recognizes the rewarding result
of a winning bet, but also appreciates the inherent risk. Consequently,
the Patel Court ruled that citizens should not have to flip a coin to see
if their constitutional rights would prevail, when one side of the coin
is prosecution under federal law. Nevertheless, the Garner Court
essentially concluded that no risk existed, since the taxpayer could
prevail after invoking Fifth Amendment privilege. Simply put, the
Patel Court appreciated the inherent risk, and the Garner Court did
not.
The reasoning of Patel should be used as a foundation for why
courts should afford taxpayers precompliance review. While not
precedent for Fifth Amendment cases, the Court could apply the
reasoning in Patel to the next taxpayer who comes before the Court in
Garner’s shoes. Using Patel, the Court would not have to expressly
overrule Garner. However, applying the reasoning in Patel would
likely make Garner no longer relevant because it would establish a
new standard, which would make precompliance review
constitutionally required, like Patel did for searches and seizures.
C. Precompliance Review From the IRS
Using PLRs as a means of precompliance review could allow
taxpayers to have the same protection without requiring a change in
the Court’s Fifth Amendment jurisprudence. The IRS does not have
the power to say what is and what is not a valid exercise of privilege,
but the IRS could assure taxpayers that it would not pursue litigation
against them for invoking the Fifth Amendment. Garner explained that
when a taxpayer claims the Fifth Amendment, the IRS is able to
proceed in two ways: (1) the IRS can attempt to prosecute the taxpayer
for tax evasion, or (2) the IRS can complete the tax returns

153. Patel, 576 U.S. at 421.
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administratively without the incriminatory information.154 But, under
this proposal, the IRS would proceed in a third way: the IRS would
advise taxpayers that it would or would not commence litigation
against them. In other words, the IRS would either notify taxpayers
that it does not consider their claims valid, in which case the taxpayers
would have to file a return, or the IRS would notify taxpayers that it
considers their claims valid, in which case the taxpayers would make
an undisclosed tax payment and be relieved from filing a return.155
Consequently, this solution would satisfy both the interests of the IRS
and the interests of taxpayers; the approach would protect taxpayers
from facing a risk when invoking the Fifth Amendment, and the
approach would still enable the IRS to receive tax revenue.
A PLR is not the same as a judicial opinion, but a PLR could
function similarly to a judicial opinion. Like a judicial opinion,
taxpayers could rely on the validity of PLRs to determine whether their
claims were valid. In other words, if the IRS determined that a
taxpayer’s Fifth Amendment claim was valid, the IRS could not “bait
and switch” and commence litigation against the taxpayer for tax
evasion since PLRs are binding on the IRS.156 Indeed, the primary
purpose of PLRs is to promote “sound tax administration” by
providing clarity to taxpayers, benefitting both the taxpayer and the
government.157 Overall, PLRs would have the same practical effect for
taxpayers as a judicial opinion. Therefore, the government could use
PLRs to offer taxpayers precompliance review.
D. Implementation
Offering precompliance review would not impede the government
from exercising its taxing power. Some might argue that affording
taxpayers greater constitutional protection would hinder the
government from collecting taxes. But that skepticism would be
shortsighted. Importantly, filing a tax return is not necessary for the
IRS to receive the tax payment; the act of filing a tax return and

154. Garner, 424 U.S. at 651. Under I.R.C. § 6020, if a taxpayer does not complete part of the
return, the Secretary has the authority to “make such return from his own knowledge or from such
information as he can obtain through testimony or otherwise.”
155. See Stanley, supra note 6, at 558 (explaining that even taxpayers with valid claims would still
have to submit a separate tax payment). But the government would have to amend these specific PLRs to
not be made public via the Freedom of Information Act.
156. Understanding
IRS
Guidance
–
A
Brief
Primer,
IRS,
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/understanding-irs-guidance-a-briefprimer#:~:text=A%20PLR%20is%20issued%20in,other%20taxpayers%20or%20IRS%20personnel
[https://perma.cc/Q5UT-CH7C] (last visited Nov. 30, 2020).
157. 26 C.F.R. § 601.201 (2020).

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol89/iss4/6

20

Hoback: Heads I Win, Tails You Lose

2021]

HEADS I WIN, TAILS YOU LOSE

1023

submitting a tax payment are two separate acts.158 Therefore, the
government’s taxing power would not be undermined by relieving a
taxpayer from filing a tax return since the taxpayer could still pay the
tax in an undisclosed payment.159 Further, offering precompliance
review would not invite frivolous claims. Either way the government
implemented precompliance review, the opportunity would not
guarantee a taxpayer victory, because a taxpayer’s claim would still
have to either survive judicial scrutiny or the IRS’s judgment of the
validity of a Fifth Amendment claim.160 Also, accessing
precompliance review would not be without cost since a taxpayer
would have to undergo administrative fees to properly obtain review,
such as attorney’s fees and filing fees. Consequently, only taxpayers
who truly believed that their contentions were valid would seek
precompliance review.161
In sum, the government has a multitude of ways to implement
precompliance review. To afford taxpayers precompliance review, the
Court could overrule Garner; the Court could apply the reasoning in
Patel; or the IRS or Congress could allow taxpayers to test their claims
through a PLR. Importantly, implementing precompliance review for
taxpayers seeking to invoke the Fifth Amendment would not require
reinventing the wheel by any means. Minimally, it should be clear that
precompliance review is available in many situations, and it makes
sense to make it available to taxpayers in the same regard. This Article
does not endorse a specific means of implementing precompliance
review, although given its relevance, extending precompliance review
from the reasoning in Patel would likely be the avenue that the Court
would take. Nevertheless, the methods would likely not produce
substantively different outcomes.
Administrative efficiency would be the biggest roadblock in
implementing precompliance review. PLRs are great in theory, but
they are very expensive for the IRS to issue.162 Therefore, the IRS has
a very narrow scope of the kinds of requests for which it will issue
PLRs.163 Consequently, in 2018, the IRS only issued 802 PLRs.164
Moreover, implementing judicial precompliance review could result in
judicial backlog. Therefore, the government would need to be very
strategic in implementing precompliance review for taxpayers.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Stanley, supra note 6, at 543.
Id.
Id. at 559.
Id.
McMahon, supra note 106.
Id.
Id. at 246.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2020

21

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 89, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 6

1024

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 89

Despite the administrative burden, precompliance review should
still be explored. First, the cost of PLRs could be worth the benefit of
more taxpayers complying with the IRS. PLRs benefit the IRS because
they promote compliance; therefore, the government investing in
expanding PLRs could result in even greater tax revenue for the IRS.
Second, if precompliance review is understood as a constitutional
right, administrative convenience should not be given as weighty of
consideration. After all, when the Court in Patel established that
precompliance review was a right, the Court did not inquire about the
administrative burden of implementing precompliance review. Finally,
the number of claims for precompliance review would not likely be
overwhelming because the taxpayers who have both earned illegal
income and believe that they have a valid claim of Fifth Amendment
privilege are likely few and far between.165 Therefore, even though the
administrative burden might be high, the government would benefit by
the gained revenue from taxpayers who would otherwise not comply
with the IRS.
V. CONCLUSION

The government should offer taxpayers the opportunity for
precompliance review. Because of the risk of prosecution for tax
evasion under an invalid claim, taxpayers might choose not to invoke
Fifth Amendment protection. Therefore, the Court should revisit
Garner and hold that taxpayers are compelled to incriminate
themselves like judicial witnesses and are thus entitled to
precompliance review. Revisiting Garner is not the only avenue for
the Court to afford taxpayers with precompliance review. In a recent
Fourth Amendment case with similar facts as Garner, the Court held
that precompliance review was constitutionally required. Since the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments seek to accomplish the same goal, the
Court could apply the reasoning in Patel to find precompliance review
necessary under the Fifth Amendment. Taxpayers do not need to rely
on the judicial branch for precompliance review. The IRS already has
a system for preliminary rulings that could be extended to taxpayers.
Therefore, by using PLRs, the IRS could allow taxpayers to obtain
precompliance review. Further research should be devoted to
determining the most efficient way to afford taxpayers precompliance
review and what such implementation would look like.
The mere ability to claim the Fifth Amendment on a tax return is not
sufficient constitutional protection. Underneath the fig leaf of an
165. Stanley, supra note 6, at 559.
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opportunity to invoke constitutional protection lies a very serious risk
that taxpayers must undergo to invoke their privilege. Because of the
risk, the government gets two bites of the apple. In other words, the
government can either hope that the taxpayer is too risk averse to
invoke the privilege, or the government can hope that when the
taxpayer invokes the privilege, the government can prosecute the
taxpayer for tax evasion. Therefore, taxpayers should be able to have
an opportunity for precompliance review so that they do not face such
a risk. Otherwise, the government will still be able to keep playing
“Heads I win, Tails you lose.”
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